COORDINATING RESEARCH THROUGH RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: GANDAL, N; SCOTCHMER, S
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90083-6
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 173-193

摘要

In a simple model, we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms' research abilities are private information. This can be done with budget balance, even though there are participation constraints. There is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms' payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities. The conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable. We give a condition under which the profit-maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance.