2-SIDED UNCERTAINTY IN THE MONOPOLY AGENDA SETTER MODEL
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BANKS, JS
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90095-B
发表日期：
1993
页码：
429-444
关键词：
摘要：
We extend the Romer-Rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment, in which (i) only the representative knows the 'status quo' outcome resulting if her take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal is rejected by the voters, while (ii) only the voters know their true preferences over policies. A separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist, and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement. Furthermore, this equilibrium has the property that, relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter, there is a downward bias in the setter's proposal, and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal's acceptance by the voter.
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