ARE FINES MORE EFFICIENT THAN IMPRISONMENT
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CHU, CYC; JIANG, N
署名单位：
National Taiwan University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90073-3
发表日期：
1993
页码：
391-413
关键词：
摘要：
It is a well-established argument in economic analysis of criminal policy that, as far as crime deterrence is concerned, we should first use the fine to its maximum before supplementing it with an imprisonment term. We show in this paper that this orthodox belief is wrong. When there is a spectrum of crimes that can be chosen by potential criminals with different levels of wealth, as is the case in reality, we show that a combination of imprisonment and a less-than-maximum fine may be more efficient in crime deterrence.
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