DOMESTIC TAX-REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
KEEN, M; LAHIRI, S
署名单位：
Queens University - Canada
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90004-D
发表日期：
1993
页码：
55-74
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines the strategic use of domestic tax instruments and the welfare effects of multilateral domestic tax reform in a model of international Cournot oligopoly. The welfare effects of commodity tax harmonization (appropriately defined) are precisely as in the competitive case: it is always potentially Pareto-improving, and starting from the Nash equilibrium in tax rates is Pareto-improving without any need for compensation. A mutual reduction of production subsidies benefits the efficient (low marginal cost) country and harms the inefficient; despite the pre-existing monopoly distortion, the effect on global efficiency is ambiguous.
来源URL：