A MODEL OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
LINDBECK, A; WEIBULL, JW
署名单位：
Stockholm University; Stockholm University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90084-7
发表日期：
1993
页码：
195-209
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies political equilibrium in a two-party representative democracy in which the political parties are policy motivated and voters trade off their policy preferences against their 'party identity'. It is shown that the parties will in general adopt differing policy positions in equilibrium, and that, under certain qualifications, the winning policy will lie between the more popular party's preferred policy and a certain utilitarian optimum. The winning policy will be closer to this utilitarian optimum the less biased the electorate is in terms of 'party identification'.
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