HIERARCHICAL DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT OF INCOME-TAX POLICIES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SANCHEZ, I; SOBEL, J
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California San Diego
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90091-7
发表日期：
1993
页码：
345-369
关键词：
摘要：
A hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the IRS. There is a fixed distribution of income in the economy. Individuals differ by their income, which is known neither to the government nor to the IRS. We completely characterize the solution to the IRS's revenue-maximizing problem. When taxpayers are risk neutral, the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups. We show that the government provides a smaller budget to the IRS than the IRS would wish.
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