STRATEGIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CARRARO, C; SINISCALCO, D
署名单位：
Fondazione Mattei; University of Turin; University of Udine
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90037-T
发表日期：
1993
页码：
309-328
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environment in the presence of trans-frontier or global pollution, Each country decides whether or not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is formed when conditions of profitability and stability (no free-riding) are satisfied. It is shown that such coalitions exist; that they tend to involve a fraction of negotiating countries; and that the number of signatory countries can be increased by means of self-financed transfers. However, expanding coalitions requires some form of commitment. Such schemes of commitment and transfers can even lead to cooperation by all countries.
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