RATHER BAIT THAN SWITCH - DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING WITH BOUNDED CONSUMER RATIONALITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NAGLER, MG
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90071-Z
发表日期：
1993
页码：
359-378
关键词：
摘要：
This paper reviews some of the theory [e.g. Posner (1973)] on the incentives of firms to advertise deceptively. It argues that the widely held belief that these incentives are small and are outweighed by important disincentives is based on unjustified assumptions about consumer rationality. The paper presents a model of advertising and consumer reactions in which consumers manifest a form of bounded rationality. Given this, it is demonstrated that, under cogent assumptions about parameter values, some firms will have an incentive to advertise deceptively, causing a net welfare loss to society in the absence of corrective policy.
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