DOUBLE INEFFICIENCY IN OPTIMALLY ORGANIZED FIRMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BOS, D; PETERS, W
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01428-Q
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 355-375
• 关键词: INEFFICIENCY; shirking; TEAM PRODUCTION

摘要

The management of a single-product monopoly sets the number of employees and the number of production teams which are to be established. However, it is well known that employees shirk in teams. Moreover, there is yet another inefficiency which is caused through the management's adjustment to its uncertain environment. The management will not choose the internal organization of the firm which minimizes costs, because this would reduce the expected revenue (or surplus if it manages a public firm). Public firms are more likely to choose a technology where cost inefficiency and shirking reinforce each other. Government price regulation fails to eliminate cost inefficiency.