UNNATURAL MONOPOLY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ESTRIN, S; DEMEZA, D
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80007-V
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 471-488
• 关键词: STATUTORY MONOPOLY; deregulation; entry

摘要

This paper investigates the merits of statutory monopoly as a means of preventing wasteful market fragmentation. The key result is that a public firm committed to price at cost may be unable to repel entry even when it is socially desirable that it should do so. Limited entry may be worse than either statutory monopoly or free entry. The robustness of results when competition stimulates a state firm to lower its costs is also examined.