OBSERVABILITY AND CHOICE OF INSTRUMENT MIX IN THE CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: XEPAPADEAS, AP
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01441-P
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 485-498
• 关键词: AMBIENT TAXES; EFFLUENT FEES; observability

摘要

In controlling environmental externalities, Pigouvian taxes are an appropriate instrument when individual emissions can be monitored, while ambient taxes are deemed appropriate to control non-point source pollution when the ambient pollution but not individual emissions can be monitored. This paper shows that under uncertainty the efficient regulatory scheme for non-point source pollution is a mix of Pigouvian and ambient taxes. The Pigouvian fees are imposed on emissions revealed by the polluting firms in exchange for a lower ambient tax. Thus a non-point source case can be gradually transformed into a point source case.