Inter-regional insurance

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Lockwood, B
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00088-7
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1-37
• 关键词: intergovernmental grants; asymmetric information; Fiscal federalism

摘要

This paper considers the problem facing a central government which can insure regional governments (by use of intergovernmental grants) against region-specific and privately observed shocks either to income, or demand for, or cost of, the public good. Notable results are: (i) depending on the source of the shock, the grant may induce over- or undersupply of the public good relative to the Samuelson rule; (ii) with public good spillovers between regions, there is two-way distortion of public good supply - that is, qualitatively different distortions (relative to the Samuelson rule) for different values of the shock; (iii) the solution to the central government's problem may depend qualitatively on whether regional taxation is lump-sum or distortionary. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.