NIMBY taxes matter: the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levinson, A
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00021-3
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 31-51
• 关键词: environmental policy; Tax competition; hazardous waste disposal taxes

摘要

This paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition, focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes. It begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient, and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters' responses. The paper then uses panel data from the Toxics Release Inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities, and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.