The productivity of schools and other local public goods producers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoxby, CM
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00025-0
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1-30
• 关键词: Local public goods; PRODUCTIVITY; AGENCY

摘要

I construct an agency model of local public goods producers in which households make Tiebout choices among jurisdictions in a world of imperfect information and costly residential mobility. I examine producers' effort and rent under local property tax finance and centralized finance. I show that, if there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions, conventional local property tax finance can attain about as much productivity as a social planner with centralized finance can, even if the social planner is armed with more information than a real social planner could plausibly have. The key insight is that decentralized Tiebout choices make some information the social planner would need verifiable and other information unnecessary. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.