Lottery or waiting-line auction?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Taylor, GA; Tsui, KKK; Zhu, LJ
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; University of Chicago; National University of Singapore; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00196-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1313-1334
• 关键词: Allocation mechanisms; lottery; waiting-line auction; rent dissipation; social surplus

摘要

This paper studies the efficiencies of the two most widely used non-price allocation mechanisms: lotteries and waiting-line auctions. As our analysis suggests, in addition to the fairness of the mechanism, the use of lotteries in lieu of waiting-line auctions can be also justified from an efficiency point of view. In particular, we show that the less dispersed consumers' time valuations are, the more efficient is a lottery relative to a waiting-line auction. In addition, we identify four conditions under which a lottery dominates a waiting-line auction in expected social surplus preserving. Furthermore, the numerical simulations we conduct indicate that over a predominantly wide range of circumstances, a lottery is more socially efficient than a waiting-line auction as an allocative mechanism in the absence of a conventional price system. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.