Government as a discriminating moliopolist in the financial market: the case of China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gordon, RH; Li, W
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00144-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 283-312
• 关键词: Financial Markets; market segmentation; price discrimination; government regulation; implicit taxes; CHINA

摘要

We show that the many unusual features of China's financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.