Optimal sin taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: O'Donoghue, Ted; Rabin, Matthew
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.001
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1825-1849
• 关键词: Hyperbolic discounting; immediate gratification; paternalism; pigouvian taxation; time inconsistency

摘要

We investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items, such as fatty foods, that people may (by their own reckoning) consume too much of We employ a standard optimal-taxation framework, but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100% self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self-control problems. We show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus. Because such taxes counteract over-consumption by consumers with self-control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self-control problems (who consume less), such taxes can even create Pareto improvements. Finally, we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self-control problems, optimal taxes can still be large. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.