Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auerbach, AJ
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 87-100
• 关键词: deficits; spending caps

摘要

In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a multi-year budget window A budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint, while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect. This paper characterizes the optimal budget window. An appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.