Markets as beneficial constraints on the government

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bisin, A; Rampini, AA
• 署名单位: New York University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 601-629
• 关键词: markets; optimal policy; optimal taxation; time consistency

摘要

We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. While unrestricted access to anonymous markets reduces the set of policy instruments available to the government, it also limits the scope of inefficient redistributive policies when the government lacks commitment. Indeed, the restrictions that anonymous markets impose on the optimal fiscal policy, especially on capital taxation and the history-dependence of income taxation, can have positive welfare effects in this case. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.