An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cremer, Jacques; Palfrey, Thomas R.
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Universite de Toulouse; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 2091-2106
• 关键词: FEDERALISM; externalities; voting

摘要

This paper proposes a framework for studying policy making in a federal system in the presence of spillover externalities. Local jurisdictions choose local policies by majority rule subject to standards that are set by majority rule at the federal level. We characterize the induced preferences of voters for federal policies, prove existence of local majority rule equilibrium, provide an example of non-existence of global majority rule equilibrium, and explore the welfare properties of federal standards in the presence of spillovers. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.