State fiscal institutions and empty-nest migration: Are Tiebout voters hobbled?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Farnham, M; Sevak, P
• 署名单位: University of Victoria; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Hunter College (CUNY)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.07.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 407-427
• 关键词: Tiebout hypothesis; taxation; migration; state and local government

摘要

Using the Health and Retirement Study and a national panel of local fiscal data, we test a lifecycle model of Tiebout sorting. On average, cross-state, empty-nest movers-presumed to be out of fiscal equilibrium-experience large fiscal gains in the form of reduced exposure to local school spending and property taxes, while local empty-nest movers experience no fiscal adjustment. We find evidence that within-state fiscal adjustment is constrained by state institutions that limit local discretion. Empty-nest households moving within states with school finance equalization do not engage in Tiebout-consistent fiscal adjustment, while those moving within states lacking school finance equalization adjust substantially. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.