Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: De Fraja, G; Landeras, P
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; Universidad de Cantabria
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.009
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 189-213
• 关键词: students effort; schools quality; peer group effect; incentives in education; competition between schools; quasi-markets

摘要

This paper studies the effects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and students, in a set-up where the students' educational attainment depends on their peer group, on their effort, and on the quality of the school's teaching. We show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the effectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive effect of lowering the students' effort. In a simple dynamic set-tip, where the reputation of the schools affects recruitment, we show that more powerful incentives and increased competition lead to segregation of pupils by ability, and may also determine lower attainment in some schools. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.