Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fearon, G; Busch, LA
• 署名单位: York University - Canada; University of Waterloo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 657-678
• 关键词: Niskanen bureau; Public Good Provision; mechanism design; audit; auction

摘要

This paper investigates the impact of a ministry's budget size on the choice between auditing a (Niskanen)bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good. The ministry's marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing. However, the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit. The study contributes to the literature by extending the Niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.