Commitment and matching contributions to public goods

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Boadway, Robin; Song, Zhen; Tremblay, Jean-Francois
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1664-1683
• 关键词: Voluntary provision; matching contributions; COMMITMENT; public goods

摘要

We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.