Sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information:: An optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Breuille, Marie-Laure; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
• 署名单位: heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Universite Paris Nanterre; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1177-1196
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; principal-agent model; public budget deficits; free-mobility equilibrium; Fiscal federalism

摘要

In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of fiscal federalism. A non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model is used to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local governments, and under citizen free mobility. We show how informational rents, landlords' interests, and citizen mobility interact to produce distortions at both ends of the type space: in particular the most efficient jurisdictions should overproduce and overtax in second-best optimum. Informational asymmetries decrease the average production of public goods and increase the inter-jurisdictional variance of taxes and public-good production. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.