Individual teacher incentives and student performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Figlio, David N.; Kenny, Lawrence W.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 901-914
• 关键词: teacher salaries; incentive systems; merit pay; teacher incentives; student performance

摘要

This paper is the first to systematically document the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement using the United States data. We combine data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey on schools, students, and their families with our own survey conducted in 2000 regarding the use of teacher incentives. This survey on teacher incentives has unique data on frequency and magnitude of merit raises and bonuses, teacher evaluation, and teacher termination. We find that test scores are higher in schools that offer individual financial incentives for good performance. Moreover, the estimated relationship between the presence of merit pay in teacher compensation and student test scores is strongest in schools that may have the least parental oversight. The association between teacher incentives and student performance could be due to better schools adopting teacher incentives or to teacher incentives eliciting more effort from teachers; it is impossible to rule out the former explanation with our cross sectional data. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.