Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gueth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; Van der Heijden, Eline
• 署名单位: University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Society; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1023-1042
• 关键词: voluntary contribution experiment; leadership; exclusion power; endogenous selection

摘要

We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.