Wealth inequality and collective action

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bardhan, Pranab; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karaivanov, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1843-1874
• 关键词: collective action; INEQUALITY; public goods

摘要

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.