The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux pricing versus bundling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hellwig, Martin F.
• 署名单位: Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 511-540
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Excludable public goods; Ramsey-Boiteux pricing; renegotiation proofness; mixed bundling

摘要

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.