DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE GIFTS ECONOMY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: OCONNELL, SA; ZELDES, SP
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Swarthmore College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(93)90053-I
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 363-379
• 关键词: DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY; altruism; gifts; overlapping generations; Saving

摘要

In the standard analysis of overlapping generations economies with gifts from children to parents, each generation takes the actions of other generations as given. The resulting equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. In reality, however, parents realize that children will respond to higher parental saving by reducing gifts. For a broad class of gift economies, this implicit tax on saving pushes the equilibrium to dynamic efficiency. This result reestablishes the potential relevance of the gift model to the US economy, renders moot an important part of the Ricardian equivalence debate, and provides a motivation for a type of social security system.