DISINFLATION WITH IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BALL, L
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(94)01166-8
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 5-23
• 关键词: BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS; disinflation

摘要

This paper presents a theory of the real effects of disinflation. As in New Keynesian models, price adjustment is staggered across firms. As in New Classical models, credibility is imperfect: the monetary authority may not complete a promised disinflation. The combination of imperfect credibility and staggering yields more plausible results than either of these assumptions alone. In particular, an announced disinflation reduces expected output if credibility is sufficiently low.