Evolution, coordination, and banking panics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Temzelides, T
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00033-0
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 163-183
• 关键词: evolution; Banking panics; contagion

摘要

I study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria, one of which involves a banking panic. The analysis is built on a repeated version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model. The optimal equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also 'risk dominant'. When there are multiple banks, the probability of observing a panic increases as the size of the banks decreases. Local interaction generates contagion effects that allow a bank run to spread first among banks in the same geographic location and then throughout the population.