Taxpayer subsidies in failed thrift resolution: The impact of FIRREA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gupta, A; LeCompte, RLB; Misra, L
• 署名单位: Wichita State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00014-7
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 327-339
• 关键词: savings and loan failures; thrift acquisitions; failure resolution

摘要

We compare the wealth effects of acquisitions of failed thrifts before and after the passage of FIRREA in August 1989. In contrast to FSLIC assisted deals in the pre-FIRREA period, we find no evidence of significant acquirer gains in RTC assisted transactions. In addition, there is no significant correlation between acquirer gains and either the number of bidders or the amount of assistance provided by the RTC. These results suggest the absence of any symmetric tax-payer overpayments in RTC assisted transactions, and indicate that regulatory and institutional changes instituted by FIRREA resulted in an improvement in the resolution process for failed thrifts.