Credibility of a new monetary regime: The currency board in Bulgaria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carlson, JA; Valev, NT
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00057-5
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 581-594
• 关键词: currency board; Bulgaria; disinflation; credibility

摘要

Low credibility, reflected in persistent expectations of high inflation, is the usual suspect in costly disinflation efforts. A currency board is a monetary regime that attempts to establish credibility by reducing uncertainty regarding the inflation preferences of the policymaker and the environment in which the policymaker operates. This paper uses unique survey data from Bulgaria and finds that expected inflation is indeed lowered by the prospect of a currency board but to a different degree for different agents. Priors of the type of the policymaker and familiarity with the operation of the currency board contribute to explaining the differences. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B,V. All rights reserved.