WAGE BARGAINING WITH TIME-VARYING THREATS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: CRAMTON, PC; TRACY, JS
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298363
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 594-617
• 关键词: asymmetric information model; strategic delay; strikes; CONTRACT; duration

摘要

We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short run (and ma even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat.