Seniority, sectoral decline, and employee retention: An analysis of layoff unemployment spells

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Idson, TL; Valletta, RG
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209826
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 654-676
• 关键词: mandatory retirement; earnings profiles; Older workers; job tenure; CONTRACTS; PRODUCTIVITY; insurance; mobility; BEHAVIOR; duration

摘要

We investigate the effect of tenure on employee retention under varying labor market conditions. Using a competing risks analysis of recall and new job acceptance applied to layoff unemployment spell data from waves 15 and 16 (1982-83) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that adverse conditions (sectoral employment decline) significantly reduce the positive tenure effect on recall probabilities. This result is consistent with firm default on delayed payment contracts and does not appear to reflect the effect of technological change on the value of firm-specific investments.