Implications of rational inattention

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Sims, CA
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(03)00029-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 665-690
• 关键词: information theory; control theory; sticky prices; inertia

摘要

A constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite Shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems. The resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical, while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.