Blueprint for an international lender of last resort

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lerrick, A; Meltzer, AH
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00212-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 289-303
• 关键词: international monetary arrangements and institutions; international lending and debt problems; International Monetary Fund; financial crises

摘要

This paper proposes a low cost alternative to the large bailout packages that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has organized to address financial crises. The IMF would act as a lender of last resort. Faced with an unsustainable debt burden, a government would declare default. It would announce negotiations to restructure its debt at a sustainable level and a minimum restructured value of the debt. During the restructuring period, the IMF would provide a cash support bid at a discount to the government's minimum offer. The IMF floor would guarantee liquidity and create a functioning market in the defaulted debt. The proposal would remedy market failure, preclude panic and contagion, and facilitate an orderly debt restructuring. This would be achieved without substantial official funds. Lenders would be forced to bear the risks they undertake thereby reducing moral hazard and future instability. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.