Incentives in basic research

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lazear, EP
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209860
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: S167-S197
• 关键词: labor contracts; COMPENSATION; performance; tournaments; pay

摘要

Individuals involved in basic research, like other workers, respond to incentives. Funding agencies provide implicit incentives when they specify the rules by which awards are made. The following analysis is an-exercise in understanding incentives at an applied level. Specific rules are examined. What is the effect of rewarding past effort? What happens when a few large awards are replaced by many small, awards? How does the timing of an a nard affect effort? How does an agency choose which topics to fund? Socially optimal rules are derived.