Competition, wage commitments, and application fees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, RQ
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209849
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 124-142
• 关键词: unemployment; models; MARKET; view

摘要

In this article I intend to justify the rare use of application fees in labor markets. I analyze a model in which there is a training or testing period preceding a worker's effective production period. With various commitment abilities of firms, I find that application fees are used if and only if all future wages can be committed before a worker applies; otherwise, no application fees will be charged. The model is then modified to explain the positive fees in journal submissions and college admissions.