Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Martin, A
署名单位:
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0304-3932
DOI:
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.07.007
发表日期:
2004
页码:
401-424
关键词:
Liquidity provision intraday interest rate moral hazard
摘要:
This paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero, even when the overnight rate is strictly positive. Because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency, this creates a role for the central bank. I allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk. I show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation, while, for certain parameters, caps cannot prevent moral hazard. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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