On the irrelevance of government debt when taxes are distortionary

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bassetto, M; Kocherlakota, N
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2002.12.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 299-304
• 关键词: Ricardian equivalence; government debt; distortionary taxes

摘要

We consider a government that can only raise funds by levying distortionary taxes. We allow the government to collect taxes in a given period that are based on incomes earned in previous periods. We show that once we do so, given any debt path, the government can adjust its tax policy so as to attain that debt path without affecting equilibrium allocations or prices. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.