Ambiguity aversion and the absence of wage indexation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mukerji, S; Tallon, JM
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.08.012
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 653-670
• 关键词: wage contracts; nominal contracts; indexation; inflation; Uncertainty aversion; Knightian uncertainty; Choquet expected utility

摘要

This paper analyzes optimal wage contracting assuming agents are not subjective expected utility maximizers but are, instead, ambiguity (or uncertainty) averse decision makers who maximize Choquet expected utility. We show that such agents will choose not to include any indexation coverage in their wage contracts even when inflation is uncertain, unless the perceived inflation uncertainty is high enough. Significantly, the exercise does not presume any exogenous costs (e.g., transactions costs) of including indexation links. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.