Market discipline and deposit insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Demirgüç-Kunt, A; Huizinga, H
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Tilburg University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.04.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 375-399
• 关键词: market discipline; Deposit insurance

摘要

Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.