The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, Tore; Paltseva, Elena
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.010
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 658-669
• 关键词: Contracting; externalities; Club goods; free-riding

摘要

Does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods? Even in a complete information environment, we find that the answer is negative. The reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage, but instead negotiate access ex post. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.