A theory of sales quotas with limited liability and rent sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oyer, P
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209964
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 405-426
• 关键词: compensation plans; CONTRACTS; salesforces; incentives; principal; agent

摘要

Sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus. This article shows that, under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes, the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota. The results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed. The model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job-specific skill.