Discretion and incentives in organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olsen, TE; Torsvik, G
• 署名单位: University of Bergen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209963
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 377-404
• 关键词: Common agency; job design; RENEGOTIATION; COMMITMENT

摘要

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organization that lasts for several periods. In a long-lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives.