Wage competition with heterogeneous workers and firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hamilton, J; Thisse, JF; Zenou, Y
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Maine System; University of Maine Orono
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209966
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 453-472
• 关键词: investment; MARKET

摘要

We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. When firms cannot observe workers' skill, firms pay workers equal wages, but workers absorb training costs. When firms can identify worker types, firms pay different net wages to different workers. Voters select the level of general education that is financed by a lump-sum tax. Workers are on average better off when firms can observe workers' skill for a given level of general human capital, but the median voter prefers a higher level of general human capital when firms cannot observe worker types.