Signaling and indirect taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Truyts, Tom
• 署名单位: KU Leuven; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.11.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 331-340
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; Indirect taxation; costly signaling; IDENTITY; D1 criterion; Monotonic signaling

摘要

Commodities communicate. We investigate optimal indirect taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices. Optimal indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game. We provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the D1 sequential equilibrium strategies. In the case of pure costly signaling, signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden. When commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling, optimal taxes are characterized by a Ramsey rule, which deals with distortions resulting from signaling. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.