Good jobs versus bad jobs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, D
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/209978
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1-21
• 关键词: unemployment-insurance; labor-market; search; wages; EFFICIENCY; models

摘要

This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high-wage (good) and low-wage (bad) jobs co-exist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare.